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Abstract
With the tremendous benefits of internet and advanced communications, there is a
serious threat from the data security perspective. There is a need of secure and robust
encryption algorithm that can be implemented on each and diverse software and hardware
platforms. Also, in block symmetric encryption algorithms, substitution boxes are the
most vital part. In this paper, we investigate semifield substitution boxes using permu-
tation of symmetric group on a set of size 8 S8 and establish an effective procedure for
generating S8 semifield substitution boxes having same algebraic properties. Further, the
strength analysis of the generated substitution boxes is carried out using the well-known
standards namely bijectivity, nonlinearity, strict avalanche criterion, bit independence
criterion, XOR table and differential invariant. Based on the analysis results, it is shown
that the cryptographic strength of generated substitution boxes is on par with the best
known 8× 8 substitution boxes. As application, an encryption algorithm is proposed
that can be employed to strengthen any kind of secure communication. The presented
algorithm is mainly based on the Shannon idea of substitution-permutation (S-P) network
where the process of substitution is performed by the proposed S8 semifield substitution
boxes and permutation operation is performed by the binary cyclic shift of substitution box
transformed data. In addition, the proposed encryption algorithm utilizes two different
chaotic maps. In order to ensure the appropriate utilization of these chaotic maps, we
carry out in-depth analyses of their behavior in the context of secure communication and
apply the pseudo-random sequences of chaotic maps in the proposed image encryption
algorithm accordingly. The statistical and simulation results imply that our encryption
scheme is secure against different attacks and can resist linear and differential cryptanaly-
sis.
Keywords: Block cipher encryption, S-box, statistical analysis, cryptanalysis.
1 Introduction
Substitution box (S-box) is the most important element in any block cipher. Being the only
nonlinear component of block cipher, a substitution box plays the vital role of inducing the
non-linearity between the ciphertext and the secret key in block cipher encryption algorithms.
Hence the S-box [1, 2, 3, 4] is used as a tool in block ciphers to enhance their resistance
against differential and linear cryptanalysis [5]. The S-box of Advanced Encryption Standard
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(AES) [6] can be defined via the arrangement of eight Boolean functions with the domain
and the range of each function as GF(28) and GF(2) respectively. In [7], Rafael Alvarez
and Gary McGuire have provided some measures to analyze the cryptographic potency of
S-box. These measures determine the cryptographic invulnerability of S-boxes against special
categories of promising attacks. In literature, it can be seen that along with injective and
surjective properties of S-boxes, only S8 S-boxes proposed by Iqtadar et. al., [8], and AES
S-box have high-quality values close to optimal readings for all of these criteria. The reason to
get similar analysis of these boxes is that S8 S-boxes are permutation extension of AES S-box
based on a symmetric group. A large number of papers have been devoted to studying finite
field S-boxes and their applications. The reader is referred to [2, 3, 4, 6, 7] for the literature on
finite field S-boxes and their applications.
1.1 Algebraic structure of semifield
This paper investigates S-boxes over the algebraic structure of semifield, defined as follows.
Definition 1.1. A finite semifield consists of a finite set S with two binary operations “+” and
“·” such that the following axioms hold:
• (S,+) forms a group with identity element 0.
• ∀a,b ∈ S: If ab = 0 then a = 0 or b = 0.
• ∀a,b ∈ S: a(b+ c) = ab+ac and (a+b)c = ac+bc.
• ∀a ∈ S ∃ a neutral element for × denoted as e which satisfies: ea = ae = a.
For example the following system S is a proper semifield having order 16. Let us consider
GF(22) =
{
0,1,ω,ω2
}
as a base field F for the construction of the semifield S24 . The form of
the elements of semifield is u+λv, where u, v ∈ F . The addition in the semifield S24 is defined
using the addition of field F as (u+λv)+ (x+λy) = (u+ v)+λ (x+ y). Multiplication in
the semifield S24 is defined in terms of the multiplication and addition of F , in the following
manner
(u+λv)(x+λy) = (ux+ v2y)+λ (vx+u2y+ v2y2).
Rows/Columns 0 1 ω ω2= 1+ω
inserts single horizontal line 0 0 λ λω λω2
1 1 1+λ 1+λω 1+λω2
ω ω ω+λ ω+λω ω+λω2
ω2= 1+ω ω2 ω+λ ω2+λω ω2+λω2
Table 1: Semifields S24 with 16 elements
In semifield, there is no associative property as contrary to let say Galois Field. This
characteristic of having no associative property makes S-boxes way more difficult to break
using linear or differential cryptanalysis. The known S-boxes based on finite fields are good
enough against known algebraic attacks, yet there could be some unknown algebraic attacks
that may weaken the confusion creating capability of finite field S-boxes. To overcome this
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possible weakness, Dumas- Orfila [19] proposed to enhance the algebraic strength of S-boxes
by considering finite semifields instead of finite fields to generate S-Boxes. The known
classification of semifields is up to 26, therefore, it is a challenge to use the small structure
24 for the construction of 28 S-boxes. Dumas- Orfila [19] utilized pseudo-extensions of
semifield of order 24 to construct 12781 non-equivalent S-Boxes with maximum cryptographic
properties. In this paper, corresponding to each and every non-equivalent S-box of Dumas-
Orfila [19], we generate 8! S-boxes with same cryptographic properties . This is achieved
by the action of symmetric group of permutation on every non-equivalent S-box of [19].
Moreover, the non-equivalent S-boxes will behave like a set. Because all 12,781 S-boxes
of [19] are non-equivalent, therefore, we have 12,781 mutually disjoint classes of S-boxes.
Further, we have shown the application of these S-boxes in image encryption.
The paper is organized as follows. The necessary details about the chaotic maps employed
in this work, along with their relevance to secure communication, are provided in Section 2.
Section 3 is divided in two parts, giving the construction methodology of proposed S-boxes
followed by analyses for evaluating their strength. Section 4 presents the proposed block
cipher. The experimental and security analysis for the proposed cipher are presented in Section
5 and Section 6, respectively. Finally, Section 7 gives the conclusion.
2 Chaos and their significance in secure communication
In recent years, number of articles published on chaotic security [9] have proven to be weak
against well known attacks [10, 11]. This is due to the fact that the researchers did not analyze
chaotic phenomena in detail with respect to secure communication [12, 13]. Although there
are many similarities between chaotic behavior of chaotic maps and randomness required in
security [14] but it still needs proper attention to be applied in this field.
In this paper, we analyze a modified version of logistic chaotic map [15] in detail with
respect to secure communication and observe the regions of interest which can be applicable
in communication security. We have employed two chaotic maps in our proposed encryption
algorithm; modified logistic map and Tangent Delay Ellipse Reflecting Cavity Map System
(TD-ERCS) [16]. The modified logistic chaotic map employed in our work is given as [17]:
(2.1) xn = rxn−1(1− x1−bn−1).
where, x0 ∈ (0,1), b ∈ [0,1) and r (depending on b) are initial seed parameters. At b = 0, the
above equation becomes the logistic map. At a specific value of b, r is a control parameter
which specifies the overall behavior of this chaotic map. In physical terms, it can be defined as
the heating in a convention or the growth rate of population of a typical bacteria type etc. Fig.
1 presents the bifurcation diagram of modified logistic map which is a combined presentation
of all the graphs plotted x against r for different values of b. Fig. 1(a) shows the bifurcation
diagram at b = 0 which is equivalent of the bifurcation diagram of logistic map. The range
of the randomness in the bifurcation diagrams at all the values of b is almost same; the only
difference between these figures is the shifting of the range for the values of r which is a
significant advantage as compared to logistic map.
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(a) (b) (c)
(d) (e) (f)
Figure 1: Bifurcation diagram of modified logistic map showing the plots of all the x-vectors
graphed against r for different values of b. In order to observe the long-term impact of
modified logistic map, the values of x are plotted after 500 iterations. (a) b = 0, (b) b = 0.2, (c)
b = 0.4, (d) b = 0.5, (e) b = 0.6 and (f) b = 0.8
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2.1 Chaotic range analysis
Taking the case b = 0.2 (Fig. 1(b)) we analyze the ranges which are r dependable. Based on
Fig. 1(b), we can divide the interval for r into three segments:
• When r∈ [1,3.5], the iteration sequence for x attains a constant value past some iterations
displaying a stable behavior. Fig. 2(a) shows the bifurcation diagram of modified
logistic map for r = 1 to r = 3.5, Fig. 2(b) demonstrates the iteration sequence for initial
conditions r = 2.5, b = 0.2, x0 = 0.5 and Fig. 2(c) illustrates the iteration sequence
for initial conditions r = 3.2, b = 0.2, x0 = 0.5. It should be noted that the iteration
sequences converge to a stable point beyond some iterations and hence are not suitable
for utilization in secure communication.
(a) (b) (c)
Figure 2: (a). Bifurcation diagram of modified logistic map x plotted against r = 1 to r = 3.5
for b = 0.2. (b) and (c). The iteration sequence plotted respectively for the initial conditions
(i) r = 2.5, b = 0.2, x0 = 0.5 and (ii) r = 3.2, b = 0.2, x0 = 0.5.
• When r ∈ (3.5,4.2), the iteration sequence for x exhibits periodic behavior with different
periodicity after some iterations. Fig. 3(a) illustrates the bifurcation diagram of modified
logistic map for r = 3.5 to r = 4.2, Fig. 3(b) demonstrates the iteration sequence for
initial conditions r = 3.7, b = 0.2, x0 = 0.5 and Fig. 3(c) displays the iteration sequence
for initial conditions r = 4.1, b = 0.2, x0 = 0.5. It is worth noticing that the iteration
sequences exhibit periodic behavior after some iterations having periodicity 2 for Fig.
3(b) and 4 for Fig. 3(c) and thus are not suitable for usage in secure communication.
• Whilst r ∈ [4.2,4.6], the iteration sequence for x exhibits chaotic behavior. Fig. 4(a)
illustrates the bifurcation diagram of modified logistic map for r = 4.2 to r = 4.6,
Fig. 4(b) demonstrates the iteration sequence for initial conditions r = 4.3, b = 0.2,
x0 = 0.5, Fig. 4(c) illustrates the iteration sequence for initial conditions r= 4.5, b= 0.2,
x0 = 0.5 and Fig. 4(d) illustrates the iteration sequence for initial conditions r = 4.56,
b = 0.2, x0 = 0.5. It should be noted that the iteration sequences are completely random
illustrating a chaotic behavior and thus can be used in secure communication. However,
the whole range between r = 4.2 to r = 4.6 does not have a chaotic illustration. For
example, when r = 4.41, it shows periodic behavior and thus is not suitable to be
applicable in secure communication as can be seen in Fig. 4(e) displaying the iteration
sequence for initial conditions of r= 4.41, b= 0.2, x0 = 0.5. Furthermore, at r= 4.52, it
shows periodic behavior and thus not suitable to be applicable in secure communication
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(a) (b) (c)
Figure 3: (a). Bifurcation diagram of modified logistic map x plotted against r = 3.5 to r = 4.2
for b = 0.2.
(b) and (c). The iteration sequence plotted respectively for the initial conditions (i) r = 3.7,
b = 0.2, x0 = 0.5 and (ii) r = 4.1, b = 0.2, x0 = 0.5.
as can be seen in Fig. 4(f) that shows the iteration sequence for initial conditions of
r = 4.52, b = 0.2, x0 = 0.5.
(a) (b) (c)
(d) (e) (f)
Figure 4: (a). Bifurcation diagram of modified logistic map x plotted against r = 4.2 to r = 4.6
for b = 0.2.
(b), (c), (d), (e) and (f). The iteration sequence plotted respectively for initial conditions (i)
r = 4.3, b = 0.2, x0 = 0.5, (ii) r = 4.5, b = 0.2, x0 = 0.5, (iii) r = 4.56, b = 0.2, x0 = 0.5, (iv)
r = 4.41, b = 0.2, x0 = 0.5 and (v) r = 4.52, b = 0.2, x0 = 0.5.
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2.2 Randomness analysis
Similar to above, we can also analyze the ranges of bifurcation diagrams for the other values
of b and can observe their chaotic ranges. Apart from visually analyzing the randomness of
these ranges, we have tested the sequence using the NIST statistical analysis suite [18] which
contains 15 statistical tests. Although these tests were primarily designed for a larger stream
of binary bits (usually > 10000), these tests can also be used on shorter streams as well as on
integer values. The results of these tests on chaotic sequences are listed in Table ?? showing
that the generated chaotic sequences pass the randomness tests.
Statistical Test P Value Decision
Frequency (Mono Bit) Test 0.9941 Passed
(Blocks sizes: 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8) 0.6724 Passed
The Runs Test 0.0251 Passed
Tests for the Longest-Run-of-Ones in a Block
(Blocks size: 8) 0.4521 Passed
The Binary Matrix Rank Test
(4 Matrices, Rows: 8, Columns: 8) 0.0745 Passed
(16 Matrices, Rows: 4, Columns: 4) 0.1214 Passed
The Discrete Fourier Transform (Spectral) Test 0.1231 Passed
The Non-overlapping Template Matching Test 0.0254 Passed
(Template length = 4, Blocks = 2, 4, 8)
The Overlapping Template Matching Test
(Template length = 4, Blocks = 4, 8) 0.5987 Passed
Maurer’s Universal Statistical Test 0.2917 Passed
The Approximate Entropy Test 0.3680 Passed
The Cumulative Sums (Cusums) Test 0.4198 Passed
Table 2: NIST statistical tests for checking the randomness of chaotic sequences obtained
from modified logistic map for initial conditions r = 4.3, x0 = 0.5 and b = 0.2. The findings
of the tests imply that the chaotic sequences pass the randomness statistical tests
2.3 Sensitivity analysis
Randomness alone is not enough for any chaotic sequence to be applied in secure commu-
nication [20, 21]. It is necessary that the chaotic sequence should be sensitive to the initial
conditions. For the example taken of modified logistic map, we have considered three scenar-
ios for sensitivity analysis; one for each initial condition of each of the parameter x0, r and
b. For comparison, Fig. 5(a) displays the graphs of chaotic sequence for modified logistic
map for initial conditions r = 4.5, x0 = 0.5000000000, b= 0.2 and for slightly changed initial
conditions r = 4.5, x0 = 0.5000000001, b = 0.2. It can be observed that both the sequences
are similar initially for up to 15 iterations, but beyond that, both sequences become com-
pletely out of phase from each other. Moreover, the modified logistic map is sensitive to the
initial conditions for r and b. Fig. 5(b) illustrates the chaotic sequence for initial conditions
r = 4.5000000000, x0 = 0.5, b = 0.2 and in the same figure, a graph is plotted for initial
conditions r = 4.5000000001, x0 = 0.5, b = 0.2. Similarly, Fig. 5(c) displays the chaotic
7
(a) (b) (c)
Figure 5: (a), (b) and (c). Chaotic sequence for modified logistic map respectively for initial
conditions (i) r = 4.5, x0 = 0.5000000000, b = 0.2 and r = 4.5, x0 = 0.5000000001, b = 0.2,
(ii) r = 4.5000000000, x0 = 0.5, b = 0.2 and r = 4.5000000001, x0 = 0.5, b = 0.2 and (iii)
r = 4.5, x0 = 0.5, b = 0.2000000000 and r = 4.5, x0 = 0.5, b = 0.2000000001.
sequence for initial conditions r = 4.5, x0 = 0.5, b = 0.2000000000 and in the same figure, a
graph is plotted for initial conditions r = 4.5, x0 = 0.5, b = 0.2000000001. It can be observed
that at the beginning the sequences in both the figures are nearly same but with increaseed
number of iterations, all the sequences are individually recognizable. For the other chaotic
map TD-ERCS, one can similarly show that it has same properties as modified logistic map.
The TD-ERCS map provides two chaotic sequences, x and k, given mathematically as [16]:
(2.2)

xn =−2kn−1yn−1+xn−1(µ
2−k2n−1)
µ2+k2n−1
.
kn =−2k
′
n−m−kn−1+kn−1k
′2
n−m
1+2kn−1k
′
n−m−k′2n−m
where,
(2.3) k
′
n =−
xn
xn
µ2.
(2.4) yn = kn−1(xn− xn−1)+ yn−1.
(2.5) kn−m =
{
xn−1
yn−1µ
2 i f n < m
xn−m
yn−mµ
2 i f n≥ m.
The initial seed parameters are,
(2.6)

x0 ∈ [−1,1],
tanα ∈ (−∞,∞),
µ ∈ (0.05,1),
m = 2,3, ...,n.
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These initial parameters, lead to
(2.7) y0 = µ
√
1− x20
(2.8) k
′
0 =−
x0
y0
µ2
(2.9) k0 =
tanα+ k′0
1− k′0tanα
3 Proposed S-boxes
The ideal scenario for the construction of 8×8 S-box based on semifield is to find a semifield
with order 256. But unfortunately, the complete classification of semifield is still unknown
and, in literature, the largest known classification of semifield with characteristic 2 is of order
64. Therefore, it is not possible to find a direct method to incorporate the nonlinear component
S-box in block cipher based for this structure. But Jean et al. [19] have shown an indirect way
for the construction of S-box based on semifield. Our proposed construction method in this
work consists of two steps.
Step 1: The first step involves construction method from [19], as explained below.
Jean et. al., [19] define a bijection T as T : (S24)
2→ (S24)2. Basically, the finite
field GF(28) is constructed with the help of quotient structure F28=F24[X ]/P(X) where
P(X) = X2+αX +β , with α , β ∈ F24 , is an irreducible polynomial of degree 2. Ac-
cording to Jean et. al., [19], the elements of F28 viewed as F24[X ]/P(X) are polynomials
of degree 1 of the form aX +b, denoted as couple (a,b) ∈ (F24)2.
Theorem 3.1. Let P(X) = X2+αX +β ∈ F24[X ], P is irreducible if and only if ∀ γ ∈
F24 , [(α− γ)γ−β ] 6= 0 [19].
definition:
Definition 3.2. Let P(X) = X2+αX +β ∈ S24[X ], P is pseudo-irreducible if and only
if ∀ γ ∈ F24 , [(α− γ)γ−β ] 6= 0 [3].
Theorem 3.3. Let P(X) = X2+αX +β ∈ S24[X ], be a pseudo-irreducible polynomial.
The transformation:
T : (S24)
2→ (S24)2
(0,0)→ (0,0)
(0,b)→ (0,b−1)
(a,b)→ (a−1c,a−1d)
such that γ = a−1b, c = [(α− γ)γ−β ]−1, and d = c(α− γ), is a bijection.
The bijection T will give us semifield S-box shown in Table 3.
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Rows/Columns 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
0 63 32 154 249 92 67 216 164 187 125 30 133 199 98 230 1
1 140 185 128 57 161 156 206 166 44 151 93 157 198 163 79 111
2 91 170 222 97 171 50 36 34 158 61 76 202 123 229 101 214
3 180 191 75 53 251 182 107 80 83 5 146 243 228 78 41 51
4 208 64 74 188 212 69 73 16 224 183 108 143 196 9 130 8
5 99 219 127 241 227 82 19 42 40 96 95 248 236 235 46 194
6 94 37 4 65 105 149 114 52 117 77 49 172 38 240 178 131
7 2 10 132 90 87 134 255 31 48 20 54 136 210 215 112 116
8 177 6 211 152 135 142 56 119 153 150 138 103 70 109 245 29
9 58 27 55 238 59 129 225 223 209 147 204 145 184 60 81 169
10 213 26 43 89 11 18 189 247 160 45 120 118 113 205 139 24
11 232 17 173 190 226 126 0 168 203 155 250 88 159 239 246 148
12 237 39 186 15 47 13 12 84 33 115 176 25 244 141 200 110
13 137 72 197 35 100 71 124 22 193 253 231 207 234 21 218 167
14 7 233 195 68 162 14 121 122 62 144 106 252 165 86 179 221
15 102 201 220 181 174 175 104 242 23 66 85 217 3 192 28 254
Table 3: S-box based on Semifields Pseudo-extensions by [19].
Step 2: In this step, the group action of S8 is applied on semifield S-box of Step 1. The
semifield S-box behaves like a set. The group action leads to generation of 40320 new
S-boxes, because the order of S8 is 40320 and corresponding to every single permutation
we have a novel S-box. The process of synthesis is explained in Fig. 6 and mathematical
expression is given below:
The action S8 S−boxes : S8×Semi f ield S−box → Semi f ield S−boxes
defined as
µ(a0a1a2a3a4a5a6a7) = (a′0a
′
1a
′
2a
′
3a
′
4a
′
5a
′
6a
′
7)
where, µ ∈ S8 and,
(a0a1a2a3a4a5a6a7),(a′0a
′
1a
′
2a
′
3a
′
4a
′
5a
′
6a
′
7) ∈ Semi f ield−S−box
.
Fig. 6, explains the mathematical action in a simplified way with three steps. Initially, in
Step 1, we have converted the elements of semifield S-box from decimal to binary values.
So we have eight different Boolean functions F0,F1,F2,F3,F4,F5,F6,F7 as shown in Fig. 6.
In step 2 we have taken an arbitrary permutation (13246578) from S8 for the construction
of one S-box. On applying this permutation on F0,F1,F2,F3,F4, F5,F6,F7, the effect of
permutation on Boolean functions will give us a new arrangement which is as follows:
F0,F2,F1,F3,F5,F4,F6,F7. At the end the binary number is converted once again in the form
of decimal values get new S8 semifield S-box.
3.1 Cryptographic strength analyses of S-box
To measure the good properties of S-box benchmark criteria are presented in literature like
bijectivity, differential approximation probability (DP), strict avalanche criterion (SAC), bit
independence criterion (BIC), nonlinearity, and linear probability (LP). We carry out the
security analysis of the proposed S-box of example given in Table 3 using these well known
criteria.
10
Figure 6: Graphical illustration of proposed algorithm
1. Bijectivity: [19] If the linear sum of the Boolean function fi of each component of the
designed n×n S-box is 2n−1 , then f is a bijection . Mathematically, we can write as
(3.10) wt(a1 f1+a2 f2+ ...+an fn).
where ai ∈ 0,1, (a1,a2, ...,an) 6= (0,0, ...,0), wt() denotes the Hamming weight. In
effect, an inverse is important specifically in a substitution netwrok, therefore S-box
should be bijective.
2. Nonlinearity: The nonlinearity of an S-box can be tested by the following formula:
(3.11) N f = 2−n
(
1−maxω∈GF(2n)
∣∣∣∣∣2−n ∑
x∈GF(2n)
(−1) f (x)⊕x.ω
∣∣∣∣∣
)
,
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where ω ∈ GF(28).
3. Strict avalanche criterion: This analysis depicts information that while one bit of eight
lengths input byte of plaintext modifies, will yield a 0.5 probability of the outcomes
changes in byte of 8 bits balanced for entries.
4. Bit independent criterion: For two Boolean function f j, fk, one can test the independence
criterion of a substitution box by validating if, for any two output bits of the S-box,
f j⊕ fk ( j 6= k) fulfills the SAC and nonlinearity.
5. XOR table and differential invariant: XOR table of substitution box basically depends
on the calculation of ρL(a,b) =
{
x ∈ GF(28) : L(x)⊕L(a⊕ x) = M} ∀a,b ∈ GF(28).
The differential invariant ρL(a,b) is found as follows:
ρL(a,b) = max︸︷︷︸
a,b∈GF(28),a 6=0
∣∣{x ∈ GF(28) : L(x)⊕L(a⊕ x) = M}∣∣.
3.2 Experimental results for proposed S-Boxes
S-boxes Non-linearity SAC BIC of Non-linearity BIC of SAC DP LP
AES S-box [6] 112 0.504 112 0.504 0.015625 0.0625
Semifield S-box [19] 112 0.503 112 0.501 0.015625 0.0625
S8 Semifield S-boxes 112 0.503 112 0.501 0.015625 0.0625
Table 4: Comparitive analysis of proposed 40320 S8 semifield S-boxes with prevailing S-boxes
In Table 4, we have shown some analyses such as linear approximation probability, differ-
ential approximation probability, strict avalanche criterion, average bit independence criterion
for nonlinearity, average bit independence criterion for strict avalanche criterion and nonlinear-
ity of proposed S8 semi-field S-boxes. Further, we have compared the cryptographic strength
of presented 40320 boxes with semi-field S-box of [19] and advanced encryption standard
(AES) S-box [6]. It can be observed that all the properties of newly generated nonlinear
components are almost equivalent to S-box of [19] and [6]. Hence, we can say that proposed
40320 S-boxes are a powerful as AES S-box, which is known as one of the most invulnerable
S-box against all kinds of differential and linear attacks.
4 Proposed lightweight block cipher
For the application of proposed S-boxes presented in the previous section, we have proposed a
lightweight block cipher which utilizes these S-boxes and can be employed for low profile
applications. The proposed cipher consists of basic confusion-diffusion network performed
by substitution and permutation. The permutation is performed with the help of cyclic shift
operation and substitution is done with the help of numerous proposed S-boxes having same
algebraic properties. The top level block description of proposed lightweight block cipher is
illustrated in Fig. 7.
The plaintext is divided and considered as individual blocks of 128-binary bits, let the
representation of 128-binary bits block of plaintext be Bp. There is whitening step beside
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Figure 7: A top level block description of proposed lightweight block cipher. The plaintext in
blocks is encrypted through substitution-permutation (cyclic shift and substitution) network in
six rounds to get the ciphertext.
the confusion-diffusion network which is performed at the very beginning. The first block
of plaintext is xored with the user supplied 128-binary bits key, K1. After the xor operation
(whitening), the xored block which is represented as Bx is the input to the substitution and
permutation modules. The next blocks of plaintext are xored with the immediate previous
blocks of ciphertext. As mentioned earlier, binary cyclic shift is performed for the permutation.
Algorithm 1 The 6-round encryption process of proposed block cipher.
Inputs: Plaintext (blocks form) Bp, User provided 128-bit key, K1, secret initial values of
modified logistic map, K2 and TD-ERCS map, K3, S-Boxes S1×Sn .
Output: Ciphertext (blocks form), Cp.
1: for j← 1 : 6 do
2: for i← 1 : no o f blocks do
3: Bx← bitxor(Bp,K(1))
4: Bc← cyclicshi f t(Bx,K2)
5: Cp← substitution(Bc,S(K3))
6: K(1) =Cp
7: Endfor
8: Endfor
Let us take x to be the chaotic sequence obtained from modified logistic chaotic map for the
initial values x0, b and r. These initial values are considered as the first three secret keys of
the proposed encryption algorithm which combines to give K2 as illustrated in Fig. 8, that is,
k12 = x0, k
2
2 = b and k
3
2 = r. The length of x is 128 which has values under modulo 8. Since
the initial range of chaotic sequence is [0, 1], therefore we multiply that sequence with 100 to
amplify the range and then limit the the sequence under modulo 8. In parallel, let the binary
representation of first 8 bits of xor block be Px. For each Px, there is a left cyclic shift of xq
binary bits which results in a cyclic shifted 8 bits, Pc and correspondingly cyclic shifted block,
Bc. For instance, let Px = 11010110 and xq = 3, then after cyclic shift, Pc = 10110110.
Take x and k be the two chaotic sequences obtained from TD-ERCS chaotic map having
initial values x0, tanα , µ and m. For simplicity and convenience, x is denoted as y. These four
initial values are considered as next four secret keys of the proposed encryption algorithm,
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that is, k13 = x0, k
2
3 = tanα , k
3
3 = µ and k
4
3 = a which combine to give K3. Since, we need only
one chaotic sequence from this map, therefore we will only use y sequence. The sequence
y has length 16 and values under modulo Sn, where, Sn denotes the total number of S-boxes
used. Initially the chaotic sequence has the range of [-1, 1], so we amplify that range by
first shifting the range from [-1, 1] to [0, 2] and then multiplying that shifted sequence with
1000, and finally limiting the sequence under modulo Sn. In parallel, for the substitution step,
combinations of 8 bits in Bc are substituted with the 8 bits of one of the proposed S-boxes.
The decision of choosing which S-box to utilize is taken by the chaotic sequence of y. Let the
binary representation of first 8 bits of Bc be Pc. For each Pc, the eight bits are split into 4 Most
Significant Bits (MSBs) and 4 Least Significant Bits (LSBs) first. These MSBs and LSBs
are then converted into decimal and these decimal values corresponds to the row and column
numbers of a particular S-box. The element at that position of specific S-box is converted into
binary having 8 bits and will be substituted in place of Pc. For instance, let Pc = 10110110
and yq = 105, then the 4 MSBs are 1011 and 4 LSBs are 0110, the decimal value at 11th row
and 5th column of 105th S-box will be substituted to get the 8 substituted binary bits Ps and
correspondingly ciphertext block, Cp.
The proposed block cipher in form of pseudo-code is illustrated in Algorithm 1. It has only
six rounds as contrary to other renown block ciphers which have more than 12 rounds. Despite
few rounds, the results are very competitive to the benchmark algorithms due to the multiple
S-boxes employed instead of a single S-box. The experimental, statistical and security analysis
are presented in the next sections to illustrate the robustness and performance effectiveness of
the proposed block cipher.
5 Experimental results and statistical analysis
For experiments, we have taken two dimensional digital images as plaintext. First, the camera-
man image having size of 256 is considered as plaintext shown in Fig. 8(a). This plainimage
is then encrypted using proposed lightweight block cipher and encrypted cameraman image is
shown in Fig. 8(b) which is completely random and gives no information regarding the original
plainimage. To see the distribution of values (image pixels) in plainimage and cipherimage,
we have plotted the histograms of these images shown in Fig. 8(c) and Fig. 8(d) respectively.
It can be observed that the distribution of the values of cipherimage is uniform showing good
resistance against frequency analysis. We have also considered a one-scale image which has
only one gray value having perfect auto-correlation as shown in Fig. 9(a). The encrypted
version of this one-scale image is shown in Fig. 9(b). The histogram of one-scale and its
encrypted version is plotted and shown in Fig. 9(c) and Fig. 9(d) respectively. It can be seen
that the histogram of the encrypted version is flat again, despite maximum auto-correlation in
the plainimage.
5.1 Statistical analysis
For further examination of the visual strength of the proposed block cipher, we have performed
different statistical analysis and have carried out a comparison of our results with the state-of-
art block cipher. We have considered the following statistical analyses.
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(a) (b)
(c) (d)
Figure 8: (a) Cameraman image having size of 256 is considered as plaintext. (b) Encrypted
cameraman image when the proposed block cipher is applied on the original cameraman
image, it can be observe that it is completely random and gives no information regarding the
plainimage. (c) Histogram of cameraman image and (d) histogram of encrypted cameraman
image.
(a) (b)
(c) (d)
Figure 9: (a) One-scale image which has only one gray value having perfect auto-correlation.
(b) The encrypted version of this one-scale image (c) Histogram of one-scale and (d) histogram
of its encrypted version.
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5.1.1 Correlation
For an image, the correlation is defined as [22]:
(5.12) Corr.=∑
a,b
(a−µa)(b−µb)ρ(a,b)
ϕaϕb
where a,b refer to position of image pixels, ρ(a,b) represents the pixel value at ath row
and bth column of image matrix, µ and ϕ respectively denote the variance and the standard
deviation. The correlation analysis measures the extent to which two neighboring image pixels
are similar, over the whole image. It has the range [−1 1] where the correlation value 1 means
the ideal correlation.
5.1.2 Entropy
The image entropy is defined as [22]:
(5.13) Entropy =−∑
a,b
pr(ρ(a,b)) log2 pr(ρ(a,b)).
where a,b refer to position of image pixels, ρ(a,b) represents the pixel value at ath row
and bth column of image matrix and pr(ρ(a,b)) is the probability of image pixel. Entropy
depicts the uncertainty of the image and has range [0 8] for an image with 256 gray scales.
The more the amount of entropy is, the more the amount of uncertainty is.
5.1.3 Contrast
The image contrast is defined as [22]:
(5.14) Contrast =∑
a,b
|a−b|2ρ(a,b).
where a,b refer to position of image pixels, ρ(a,b) represents the pixel value at ath row
and bth column of image mtrix. The contrast analysis of the image is carried out for the
purpose of identification of objects in texture of an image. The range of contrast values is
[0 (size(Image)−1)2]. For a constant image, the contrast value is 0. The more the amount of
contrast is, the more is the variation in image pixels.
5.1.4 Homogeneity
The image homogeneity is defined as [22]:
(5.15) Homo.=∑
a,b
ρ(a,b)
1+ |a−b|
where a,b refer to position of image pixels. The nearness of the distribution in the gray
level cooccurrence matrix (GLCM) to GLCM diagonal is determined by homogeneity analysis.
The homogeneity values range is [0 1].
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5.1.5 Energy
The image energy is defined as [22]:
(5.16) Energy =∑
a,b
ρ(a,b)2.
where a,b refer to position of image pixels. The energy analysis provides the sum of
squared elements in the GLCM. The energy values have range [0 1]. For a constant image, the
energy value is 1.
Table 5 shows the outcome of the above analyses for the proposed image encryption
scheme. It also provides a comparative study with the benchmark blockcipher of AES. It is
worth noticing that the presented scheme depicts competitive results despite significant lower
computational complexity.
Analysis Corr. Entropy Homo. ContrastEnergy
Prop. -4e-4 7.9974 0.9952 0.0434 0.9911
AES -4e-3 7.9967 0.9934 0.3678 0.9851
Table 5: Comparative statistical analysis of proposed and AES cipher.
6 Security analysis
For the robustness and to check whether the proposed cipher can resist against known attacks,
we have carried out series of security analysis that will ensure the effectiveness of proposed
cipher.
6.1 Key space and key sensitivity
The total number of secure keys that can be used in the cipher is referred as key space. In
our proposed work, we have used three keys, in which, the first one is the user provided 128
binary bit key, second and third are the combination of initial values of the two chaotic maps
used. The total combination of these three secure keys is sufficiently large so, for checking all
the combinations, any modern computer should take more than 1010 years. Thus the proposed
cipher can resist to any brute force attack.
However, key space alone is not enough to guarantee the effectiveness of a cipher in this
regard. It is necessary that with the key space, key sensitivity should be achieved as well.
Key sensitivity refers to a property of cipher in which the decryption of ciphertext can not
be successively achieved despite the fact that there is a minor change in the encryption and
decryption keys. For the analysis, first, we have taken the cameraman image (shown in Fig.
8(a)) and encrypted with the proposed cipher (Fig. 8(b) shows the encrypted image). For
the decryption, we have slightly changed the decryption keys and attempted decrypting the
encrypted images with these slightly altered decryption keys. Fig. 10(a) shows the decrypted
image in which K1 is changed by a single binary bit. Fig. 10(b) shows the decrypted image in
which b of K2 is changed from b = 0.2000000000 to b = 0.2000000001. Fig. 10(c) shows the
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(a) (b)
(c) (d)
Figure 10: Decrypted image in which K1 is changed by a single binary bit. Decrypted image for
which, the decryption key of b of K2 is changed from b= 0.2000000000 to b= 0.2000000001.
Decrypted for which, the decryption key of r of K2 is changed from r = 4.5000000000 to
r = 4.5000000001. Decrypted for which, the decryption key of x0 of K3 is changed from
x0 = 0.5000000000 to x0 = 0.5000000001.
decrypted image in which r of K2 is changed from r = 4.5000000000 to r = 4.5000000001.
Fig. 10(d) shows the decrypted image in which x0 of K3 is changed from x0 = 0.5000000000
to x0 = 0.5000000001. It can be seen that, even for a small modification in the decryption
keys, decryption is unsuccessful in all of considered images.
6.2 Avalanche analysis
The avalanche effect refers to an appealing characteristics of cryptosystems. The avalanche
effect is evident when a slight change in the input (for instance, flipping a single bit) leads
to a notable change in the output (like change in half the output bits). Mathematically, the
avalanche effect can be determined by the following formulas for the number of pixel change
rate (NPCR) and the unified average change intensity (UACI) [23].
(6.17) NPCR =
∑a,b D(a,b)
N×M ×100%,
(6.18) UACI =
1
N×M
[
∑
a,b
|A1(a,b)−A2(a,b)|
255
]
×100%,
where A1 and A2 are the two encrypted images acquired from the original image with the
disparity of a single pixel, N and M represent the number of rows and columns of encrypted
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image matrix, and D(a,b) is defined as
D(a,b) =
{
0 if A1(a,b) = A2(a,b),
1 if A1(a,b) 6= A2(a,b).
NPCR yields the rate of change of number of pixels of encrypted image once a single pixel
of original image is amended. UACI determines normal power of contrasts between original
and encrypted images. The least required value for NPCR must be 50%. NPCR and UACI
analysis is carried out for some standard images of image processing such as Lena, cameraman
and baboon. We have taken three cases to analyze the NPCR and UACI cryptographic strength
for propoased image encryption technique, for each of the considered images. For analysis,
firstly a pixel is chosen in the first two rows of the original image and then the procedure is
repeated for two other parts (roughly in middle and end) of the data. The comparative analysis
of the proposed image encryption technique with the AES for NPCR and UACI is provided in
Table 6. It can be seen that proposed algorithm is competing with the most widely applicable
and economical block cipher cryptosystem.
Analysis NPCR(%) UACI(%)
Images & Loc. Prop. AES Prop. AES
Cman
first 99.5463 99.6048 33.1521 33.5360
mid 99.5412 99.6201 33.2512 33.5212
last 99.5874 99.5819 33.3981 33.5245
Lena
first 99.2632 99.6094 33.4521 33.3996
mid 99.3698 99.6506 33.3874 33.3139
last 99.4529 99.6002 33.5214 33.5133
Baboon
first 99.4563 99.6124 33.5210 33.4463
mid 99.5210 99.6033 33.2363 33.4561
last 99.5632 99.6185 33.3152 33.5252
Key S.
Case I 99.5298 99.5972 33.6210 33.5029
Case
II
99.6210 99.6460 33.3698 33.5468
Table 6: Comparative NPCR and UACI analysis of proposed cipher with AES on the images
of cameraman, lena and baboon for three cases: a single bit change in first pixel, in mid pixel
and in last pixel. The analysis of two different cases for key sensitivity are also presented here.
Moreover, we have done NPCR and UACI analysis to analyze the key security of proposed
key schedule. We consider following two cases.
Case I We have applied two different encryption keys having a single bit difference on same
original image to get two significantly different encrypted images having NPRC and
UACI values 99.5298 and 33.6210 respectively.
Case II Here we have applied two different decryption keys having a single bit difference on
same encrypted image to get two significantly different decrypted images having NPRC
and UACI values 99.6210 and 33.3698 respectively.
The comparative analysis of the proposed image encryption technique with the AES for key
sensitivity using NPCR and UACI is given in Table 6. The values of the analysis show that the
proposed key schedule is invulnerable for image encryption.
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6.3 Cryptanalysis
To analyze the full cryptographic strength of proposed image cryptosystem against known
attacks, it is required to pass plainimage through complete rounds. The known attacks are as
follows.
6.3.1 Linear cryptanalysis
Th linear approximation probability (LP) is utilized to measure the discrepancy of an event.
This test is useful in determining the optimum value of discrepancy in the outcome of event.
The two masks, Γy and Γx, are utilized for parity of the output and input bits, respectively. For
the nonlinear component of block cipher, LP is defined as [24]:
(6.19) LP = maxΓxΓy6=0
∣∣∣∣#{x/X •Γx = S(x)•Γy = ∆y}2n − 12
∣∣∣∣ ,
where all possible unique inputs are contained in the set X and the cardinality of X is 2n.
The average maximum value of LP of proposed cryptosystem having 1 round and 8 S-boxes is
LPmax = 2−4.21. Furthermore, the generalization of proposed cryptosystem with 256 active
S-Boxes and 4-rounds will give us average maximum value LP4rmax = 2
−4.21×256 = 2−1077. It
is worth mentioning that to a certain extent, it is difficult to launch linear cryptanalysis against
proposed cryptosystem.
6.3.2 Differential cryptanalysis
With a specific end goal to guarantee uniform mapping, the differential at input should
exceptionally guide to an output differential. These attributes ensure uniform mapping
probability for each input bit i. The differential approximation probability scheme for S-
Box determines the differential uniformity, defined as [25]:
(6.20) DP(∆x→ ∆y) =
[
#{x ∈ X/S(x)⊕S(x⊕∆x) = ∆y}
2m
]
,
where ∆y and ∆x are output and input differential, respectively. We have applied 256
S-boxes with good cryptographic properties and have extended proposed algorithm for 4
rounds to get good results against DP. DPmax = 2−4.05 is the average maximum DP of the
S-Boxes used. The value of DP of the proposed cryptosystem guarantees the cryptographic
strength of the proposed algorithm against differential cryptanalysis.
7 Conclusion
This paper is concerned with the study of S-boxes based on semifield and their application
to develop a block cipher that can be employed for low profile applications. Although the
currently known S-boxes based on finite fields perform well against known algebraic attacks,
it is possible that there could be some unknown algebraic attacks that may beat the confusion
creating capability of finite field S-boxes. In [19], it was proposed to consider finite semifields
instead of finite fields to generate S-Boxes in order to to enhance the algebraic strength
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of S-boxes against unknown algebraic attacks. The algebraic structure of semifield is not
commonly used in block cipher cryptography because it does not have complete classification
up to finite order. In fact, the known classification of semifields is up to 26. This makes it
challenging to use the small structure 24 for the construction of 28 S-boxes. Dumas- Orfila
[19] utilized pseudo-extensions of semifield of order 24 to construct 12781 non-equivalent
S-Boxes with good cryptographic properties. Here we establish an effective procedure for
generating S8 semifield S-boxes having same algebraic properties. Utilizing the action of
symmetric group of permutation on every non-equivalent S-box of [19], corresponding to each
and every non-equivalent S-box of Dumas- Orfila [19], we generate 8! S-boxes with same
cryptographic properties. In total, this leads to 515329920 new S-boxes based on semifield
and symmetric group.
As application, a block cipher is proposed utilizing S8 semifield substitution boxes and
two chaotic maps. The proposed cipher consists of three modules which are operated for
six rounds. These three modules are substitution, permutation and XOR whitening. In the
substitution process, multiple proposed S-boxes are used to get desired confusion between the
ciphertext and secret key. This module enhances security, and the desired security is attained
in less number of rounds as compared to conventional block ciphers. Each module is applied
in agreement with the specific chaotic sequence generated through a distinct chaotic map.
Security analysis is performed and the simulation results confirm that the proposed algorithm
is secure against well known attacks.
Finally, the proposed encryption algorithm is flexible that can be adapted to changes as
required. For instance, it is possible to increase or decrease the number of rounds and S-boxes
as well as to replace semifield S-boxes with other S-boxes.
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